Rommel Rundstedt Controversy Essay -- War, Invasion of France, Normand

There argon significant reasons why Field cite von von Rundstedts working(a) concept to defend against the Allied invasion of France was superior to Field Marshal Rommels and could suffer changed the course of the war. Geographically, Rundstedts concept provided the Germans the outstrip chance to defeat the Allied advance. Operationally, he accounted for several military and recognition assessment considerations that gave his plan the edge. From a strategic and political standpoint, had Hitler been willing to perform peace, a major Allied defeat in France offered by Rundstedts plan presented Germany its last chance to achieve victory.Had Rommel made a proper assessment of the French coastline and countryside, he would have probably sided with Rundstedt. It was score to von Rundstedt that 2,600 kilometers of coastline could not be made impregnable (Ose, 8) In Rundstedts view, the best strategy to defend the coast called for using an disgustful defensive by operating behin d the coast strong arrayed divisions, strictly controlled and flexibly led. (Ose, 9) Obvious geographic challenges along the coast meant that Rommels plan to be decisive with armored divisions would have presumption the German Army little chance of success. The first major problem with Rommels plan was the length of coastline which would have been impossible to defend unless he was halcyon enough to determine the exact time and location of attack. The long coastline of France had already overextended German forces and their defenses were growing weaker due to commitments elsewhere in the European theater. (Cubbage, 149) horizontal with Rommels plan for extensive obstacles along the coast, it seems he forgot that a concrete and steel barrier with an exploitable wea... ...epts to defeat the Allied invasion of France. Upon examination of separately operational concept, it becomes clear that Rundstedts plan would have given the German Army the best chance of success. In the summer of 1944, a decisive victory over Allied forces in France could have displace Great Britain and the United States to the negotiating table. A decisive victory would have too afforded the Germans more forces on the Eastern Front. More forces in the east could have halted the Soviet advance, and could have brought Stalin to the negotiating table as well. Given those possibilities, we know in hindsight that it would have been unlikely for Hitler or the Allies to accept anything less than tally victory. In other words, the operational success offered by Rundstedts plan would not have translated into strategic victory given the finalise of Hitler and the Allies.